Prominent thinkers such as Jurgen Habermas and Michael Sandel are warning that biomedical enhancements will undermine fundamental political values. Yet whether biomedical enhancements will undermine such values depends on how biomedical enhancements will function, how they will be administered and to whom. Since only few enhancements are obtainable, it is difficult to tell whether these predictions are sound. Nevertheless, such warnings are extremely valuable. As a society we must, at the very least, be aware of developments that could have harmful (...) consequences. Indeed, if important values were to be jeopardized, we should take appropriate measures to protect them. This paper focuses on four central values: solidarity, personal responsibility, equality and autonomy. It delineates the conditions under which biomedical enhancements would undermine these values. It also details the circumstances under which these values would be unaffected by enhancements as well as those under which they would be promoted. Specifying these conditions is valuable; it would enable society to prepare appropriate ethical guidelines and policy responses in advance. (shrink)

Desde el punto de vista temático, el libro abarca prácticamente todo lo que se incluye bajo el llamado problema de la filosofía latinoamericana: su posibilidad, especificidad, autenticidad, sus orígenes, rasgos esenciales, etc. En cuanto a autores, se exponen con mayor extensión los postpositivistas Korn y Vaz Ferreira y, entre los más actuales, José Gaos, Leopoldo Zea, Arturo A. Roig, Enrique Dussel, y Marquínez Argote. Se plantea la cuestión del método de la investigación histórico-filosófica. Se critican las posiciones de la CEPAL. (...) Por último, el libro dedica extensa atención a la filosofía de la liberación, sus orígenes y los problemas que actualmente se le plantean. Toda la temática está abordada en sintonía con el latinoamericanismo filosófico actual"--Handbook of Latin American Studies, v. 58. (shrink)

The Tattvabindu of Vacaspatimisra with the commentary called Tattvavibhavand of Paramesvara II of Payyur Bhattamana. This edition of Vacaspatimisra's Tattvabindu and of its commentary Tattvavibhavana by Paramesvara II is based on (1) a transcript of a manuscript Tattvavibhavana preserved in the Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, and (2) the Benares Edition of the Tattvabindu. Since the commentator has made it a rule to quote the full text by parts before commenting on it. Vacaspatimisra's Tattvabindu is a short and highly difficult (...) text. In his characteristically rhythmic and stately diction, Vacaspatimisra reviews in the Tattvabindu, the vaiyakarana doctrine of Sphota, mainly as expounded by Bhartrhari and Mandanamisra, and amplifies and reaffirms Kumarila's criticism of Sphota doctrine. The elaborate and scholarly introduction, giving a historical sketch of the Mimamsa literature, and the thoroughgoing analysis of the Tattvabindu, in English, which the learned editor has prefixed to his edition of the work. (shrink)

This paper proposes research propositions to study on MMOG and MUD addictions based on their causes – flow state and social interaction. Though previous studies relate MMOG addictions to Internet addictions based on social interactions, this study after examining the underlying theories of Use and Gratification The-ory and Flow Theory concludes that what cause MMOG addiction is flow experience not social interaction. On the other hand, the cause of MUD addiction is social interaction. After proposing the propositions of MUD and (...) MMOG addiction causes, this study provides possible impacts of such addictions based on the reasoning between the two theories and two online game addictions. (shrink)

[t. 1] Pathétique de l'engagement.--[t. 2, v. 1] Poétique de l'engagement.

v. 1. Dels orígens al segle XIX -- v. 2. Temes marginals del segle XIX i el segle XX.

Cette édition numérique a été réalisée à partir d'un support physique, parfois ancien, conservé au sein du dépôt légal de la Bibliothèque nationale de France, conformément à la loi n° 2012-287 du 1er mars 2012 relative à l'exploitation des Livres indisponibles du XXe siècle. Pages de début Remerciements L'échéance d'une fin I. Subjectivité II. Modernité III. Historicité IV. Heuristicité V. ScepticismeAntifondamentalisme et utopie Bibliographie Pages de fin.

Članek nudi kratek opis zanimive zgodovine slikarstva in slikarskih teorij v hitro razvijajočem se Hong Kongu od l. 1940 do l. 1980, tako da poudari delo in estetiko večih reprezentativnih lokalnih kitajskih slikarjev in umetniških smeri. Ta oris zgodovine prikazuje iskanje kulturne identitete in različne drže med kitajskimi slikarji, ki so bíli boj med moderniziranimi in zahodnimi vplivi v umetnosti ter svojim kitajskim izročilom. Avtorica primerja to slikarstvo z držami mlajše generacije osemdesetih let, ki odseva kapitalistične vplive pri iskanju umetniške (...) identitete. Zaključni del vsebuje kritično primerjavo umetnosti in teorij kulture v sodobnem postkolonialnem diskurzu glede na njihovo aplikacijo na razmere v Hong Kongu. (shrink)

Avtor se loteva postapartheidovskega branja »spomenika ženskam«, ki so ga leta 1913 odkrili v Južni Afriki. Oris družbene funkcije podobnih spomenikov služi, da bi poudarili estetsko ideologijo »Spomenika ženskam«. Avtor meni, da bi spomenik, takšnega kot je, lahko rehabilitirali v postapartheidovski družbi, če bi njegovo percepcijo dopolnjevalo širše poznavanje vojnega trpljenja. Spomenik bi lahko rekontekstualizirali tako, da bi omogočili slišanje drugih glasov, tj. glasov ženskih in črnskih žrtev davnega spopada med Buri in Britanci.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Objective Reality of Ideas in Descartes, Caterus, and Su irez NORMAN j. WELLS IT HAS LONG BEEN ACKNOWLEDGEDthat Francisco Sufirez's distinction between a formal and an objective concept exercised some influence upon Descartes's teaching on 'idea'.' It would appear, however, that not enough attention has been given to that distinction of Sufirez (and especially to another to be mentioned shordy) to aid in dispelling what I take to be (...) a widespread confusion and misunderstanding with regard to 'idea' in Descartes, especially with respect to 'idea' taken 'objectively'. Much, if not all, of the confusion in question has to do with Descartes's admittedly equivocal use of the term 'idea'. For he had allowed that 'idea' could be taken 'materially' (materialiter), on the one hand, for the knowing activity of the intellect. On the other hand, it could be taken 'objectively' (objective) for the thing (res) represented by that knowing activity.' At this point, the contemporary reader can only be brought up short, See E. Gilson, Index scolastico-cart~sien (New York: Burt Franklin Reprint, 1912), 48-49; Discours de la m~thode: Texte et commentazre (Paris: J. Vrin, 1947), 321; G. Rodis-Lewisin her edition of Meditationes de Prima PhRosoph.m (Paris: J. Vrin, 1953), 41 n. 1; L'oeuure de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1971), 53~ n. 8; J. Collins, Modern European Philosophy (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1954), 165;T.J. Cronin, S.J., Objecttve Being m Descartes and SuArez (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1966); "Objective Reality of Ideas in Human Thought: Descartes and Su~rez," Wisdom in Depth: Essays in Honor of Henri Renard, SJ., eds. V. F. Daues, S.J., M. R. Holloway, S.J., L. Sweeney, S.J. (Milwaukee : Bruce, 1966), 68-79; L. Gilen, S.J., "Uber die Beziehungen Descartes zur zeitgenossischen Scholastik," Scholastik 32 (1957): 41-66; R. Dalbiez, "Les sources scolastiques de la th~orie cart6sienne de l'&re objectif," Revue d'histoire de la philosophic 3 (1929): 464-72;J. Owens, C.S.S.R., in The Cambridge HtstoU of Later Medu,val Philosophy, eds. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 459; G. Nuchelmans,Judgment and Propositwnfrom Descartesto Kant (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1983), 36-54. " Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. C. Adam et P. Tannery, 11 vols. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1897-19o9; hereafter cited according to volume, page and line), Praefatio ad Lectorem, 7: 8. 19-251 "Sed respondeo hic subesse aequivocationem in voce ideae: sumi enim potest vel materialiter, pro operatione intellectus, quo sensu me perfectior dici nequit, vel objective, pro re per istam operationem repraesentata, quae res, etsi non supponatur extra intellectum existere, potest tamen me esse perfectior ratione suae essentiae." It is clear that two realities are to be causally accounted for. The [33] 34 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28"1 JANUARY 1990 conditioned as we are by an appreciation of 'objectivity' altogether extramental! It makes for a considerable wrench of perspective to do justice to Descartes's acknowledged doctrine of intramental objectivity and an intramental 'thing represented' (resrepraesentata). 'Idea', then, in traditional Cartesian fashion, designates the act of representing as well as the 'thing represented '. S Yet, for all this, and despite repeated expressions of the same doctrine, there is a persistent tendency in the history of Cartesianism and its scholarship to interpret 'idea' taken 'objectively' as in some way representative. Contrary to what I take to be Descartes's constant position, such a rendering unwittingly transfers that function which is proper to the cognitive activity, mind is the efficient cause of its cognitive activity. With respect to ideas taken 'objectively', such as the ideas of God and the triangle on the levels of metaphysical and mathematical intelligibility, an efficient cause, extrinsic to the mind, is certainly at issue. For here we are in the presence of what is independent of the mind, however intramental it may be. On the triangle, see Medit. 5; 7: 64. ]4s7 : "...est tamen profecto determinata quaedam ejus natura, sire essentia, sive forma, immutabUis et aeterna, quae a me non efficta est, nec a mente mea dependet." For the idea of God, see Medit. 5; 7: 68. l o-12: "Nam sane multis modis inteUigo illam [ideam... (shrink)

Članek se ukvarja s pojmom uklonljivosti, s posebnim ozirom na uklonljivost moralnih in pravnih norm. Na začetku začrtamo grob oris pojava uklonljivosti, ki je zahteven izziv tako za moralno kot tudi za pravno teorijo. Opozorimo na pogoje in primerjalne prednosti, ki naj bi jih izpolnjeval oz. imel model uklonljivosti. Nadalje se v članku osredotočimo na svojstven model uklonljivosti, ki uporablja pojem normalnih pogojev da bi zajel omenjeni pojem uklonljivosti norm. Trdimo, da temu modelu pri tem spodleti, posebej z vidika predpostavke (...) nadaljnjih pomembnih norm, za katere imamo upravičene razloge za dvom, da so prav tako uklonljive. Tako ta model ne dopušča, da bi uklonljivost segala do samih temeljev zadevnega normativnega področja in omeji značilnost uklonljivosti na norme na srednji ravni. V zaključku poudarimo nekaj naukov te razprave in jih umestimo v širše polje pluralističnega pristopa k normam. (shrink)

Uvodno poglavje je pregled razprav o svobodi spod peresa določenih nevrofiziologov iz Nemčije. V tem okviru lahko pridemo do zaključka, da ni potrebna vrzel v vzročnosti narave, da bi lahko obstajalo nekaj takega kot svoboda. V tem oziru so Libetovi eksperimenti nekonsistentni. Svoboda je v bistvenem smislu prostost od določenosti volje po volji drugega. In svoboda ima enako kot človekova zavest bistveno družbeno formo. To pa še ne pomeni, da lahko podamo oris naravne zgodovine svobode, zgodovine, v kateri bi neizogiben (...) razvoj človeškega bitja in neomejena svoboda gibanja predstavljala bistveni razvojni fazi. Pričujoči članek je tako poskus razumevanja svobode v perspektivi zgodovine evolucije.In an introductory chapter I canvass a discussion concerning freedom which has been introduced, in Germany, by certain neurophysiologists. I conclude, with regard to this discussion, that no gap in the causality of nature is required in order for there to be freedom. In this respect, then, the Libet experiments prove inconclusive. Freedom is, essentially, freedom from the determination of one’s will by the will of others. And like human consciousness, freedom has an essentially social form. This, however, does not preclude that we may make a sketch of the natural history of freedom, a history in which the unfettered development of a living being and an uninhibited freedom of movement represent essential stages. This essay makes a case for placing the social and political understanding of freedom in the perspective of the history of evolution. (shrink)

La reconstruction est encore incomplète et lacunaire, mais l’on devine déjà l’allure complète du projet. Le trait les plus importants en sont les suivants. -/- i) Le premier niveau empirique correspond à ce que Piaget a appelé les tableaux perceptifs, et à leurs copies dans la mémoire, mais sans ordre temporel, sans structure spatiale et ne contenant pas encore des objets. ii) La première construction théorique permet d’obtenir le temps. iii) A partir de l’ordre temporel, une première structure spatiale (bidimensionnelle) (...) est possible, sans introduction de nouveaux niveaux théoriques. Ces niveaux théoriques semblent en revanche être nécessaires pour la construction d’une structure spatiale tri- dimensionnelle. Ce pas n’a pas encore été franchi. Il sera cer- tainement relié à la construction de la notion d’objet. iv) Ici la construction présente un premier grand vide. Un saut est effectué jusqu’à une théorie générale de la substance, appelée système physique. Il s’agit en réalité d’une théorie de la mesure, c’est-à-dire du procédé qui permet à la fois de connaître les propriétés des systèmes physiques, propriétés qui exigent un niveau théorique propre, et de définir un premier critère d’acceptation de l’identification des substances. Il s’agit d’une théorie holiste relative à l’introduction de termes théoriques. v) Cette description générale permet les premiers pas vers une théorie de la mécanique quantique. vi) Il est aussi possible dans le même cadre de recomprendre les notions élémentaires de la mécanique classique, sans présupposer les notions de masse et de force. vii) Dans d’autres travaux, qui ont servi de préparation à celui-ci, les notions de sujet, d’intersubjectivité et de conscience ont également été approchées d’une façon constructiviste. L’esquisse de la construction a même été prolongée jusqu’au domaine de la morale. Ces dernières notions ne font pas l’objet de cette recherche. -/- Ces éléments ont été évoqués ici pour donner une vision d’ensemble du projet, qui peut être visualisé dans le schéma suivant. (shrink)

E l conflict o entr e l a democraci a a g r e gat iva (basad a e n e l v alo r igualitari o d e l a r e gla d e l a m a y oría ) y l a deliberat iva (centrad a e n l a fuerz a epistémic a de l mejo r a r gumento) constitu ye un a d e la s principale s tensione s d e l a (...) teorí a contemporáne a d e l a democracia. Est e trabaj o sostien e qu e quiene s dibuja n dich o conflict o l o hace n a pa r ti r d e un a visión e xces iv ament e optimist a de l v alo r mora l d e l a primer a y demasiad o pesimist a de l carácte r no igualitari o d e l a s e gunda . N i l a con e xió n d e l a r e gl a d e l a m a y orí a co n l a igualda d política sería n ta n fue r t e y e xclus iv a , n i l a deliberació n u n proces o controla b l e únicament e po r la búsqued a objet iva d e solucione s política s co r recta s y n o tambié n po r e xigencia s d e justicia procedimental . N o obstante , aunqu e co n una s proporcione s mucho s meno s e xagerada s a la sugeridas , e xistirí a entr e ambo s procedimiento s u n cie r t o g rad o d e incompatibilida d que podría , s i n o superars e po r completo , s í relajars e d e admiti r qu e cualquie r justi f icació n de u n procedimient o d e tom a d e decisione s n o pued e desa r rollars e d e fo r m a completamente abstracta , sin o qu e h a d e ajustars e a l cont e xto. (shrink)

Qui n'a souvenir de la grande palabre sur la philosophie africaine? Paulin Houtondji, Marcien Towa, Eboussi Boulaga, Niamkey Koffi et bien d'autres y ont valablement laissé du leur au point de s'imposer aujourd'hui comme des références incontournables de la philosophie d'Afrique. On est parfois tenté de songer à la fin de l'activité philosophique chez les Africains avec ceux-là. C'est justement à cette éventuelle fin que refusent de souscrire aussi bien le philosophe congolais Claver Boundja que l'équipe de jeunes philosophes ayant (...) tous pour ambition "de réouvrir à nouveaux frais le débat sur le développement en Afrique". L'à-propos quant à l'absence métathéorique que la théorie du développement de Boundja vient combler dans la philosophie contemporaine fait l'unanimité parmi les contributeurs. En outre, la théorie philosophique du développement de Boundja se démarque de la conception marxiste de celle-ci, dans la mesure où Boundja ancre la pensée philosophique fondamentale de type métaphysique dans la question du développement humain. Elle s'émancipe du volet socio-économique avec ses pesanteurs sociohistoriques pour interroger le bien-être non calculé de l'humain. Dans une herméneutique circonstanciée, les auteurs examinent le développement non pas en confinant celui-ci aux vues de Boundja, mais en l'ouvrant aux interrogations sur l'humain et ses conditions ou ses possibilités de réalisation de vie épanouie. C'est pourquoi Boundja est tantôt questionné, tantôt exploré comme atelier pour l'émancipation féministe, tantôt encore mis en dialogue avec Ebenezer Njoh-Mouellé, V.Y. Mudimbe non sans évoquer en filigrane, Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum, etc."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Wedin considers the relation between the ontological commitment in the Categories and the semantical theory of underlying ontological configurations for standard categorical statements. According to Wedin, Aristotle's fourfold division of beings, which divides things according to whether they are, or are not, said of, and/or present in a subject, is a meta‐ontology that is concerned with beings per se, i.e. the fundamental things that are. Wedin explains that the primacy of c‐substance involves an asymmetry in the relation between c‐substance and (...) everything else, or between the substantial and the nonsubstantial. This is because there is an ontological dependence of non‐substances, and also of secondary substances, on substances: everything is either said of, or in, primary substance. The argument of this chapter, then, is that the world of the Categories is a world of individuals: all ontological relations needed for semantics can be accommodated by appeal to individuals only. (shrink)

Wedin argues that Aristotle makes form the substance of c‐substances because it is the essence of the c‐substance. Much of this chapter consists of a careful examination of a passage in Metaphysics Zeta 4, which Wedin calls the ‘New Primacy Passage’, that is crucial to Wedin's overall thesis, because here Aristotle appeals to a notion of definitional primacy, as opposed to the ontological primacy of the Categories. Z.4 focuses on this claim that form must be essence: Wedin argues that essence (...) is a certain kind of form, a form of a genus ; this does not mean ‘species’, as some commentators have thought. This is because the species is a combination of form and matter, whereas the genous eidos, Wedin argues, is the formal part only of the definition that applies to the thing. On Wedin's account, Aristotle introduces the notion of explanatory primacy of form in Z.4. (shrink)

Wedin offers an interpretation of Metaphysics Zeta 13, a very important and difficult chapter, where Aristotle apparently denies that substance is a universal, having, on most accounts, already claimed that form is substance, and that form is a universal. This interpretation of the argument of Z.13, Wedin argues, threatens the possibility of attaining a definition of substance, and places in doubt what has gone before in the treatise. According to Wedin, what Aristotle is concerned with in Z.13 is not the (...) denial that substance is a universal but rather with the denial that anything predicated universally of a c‐substance is the substance‐of the c‐substance, which Wedin calls ‘Weak proscription’. In Wedin's account of Z.13, then, Aristotle is continuing to pursue issues first raised in Z.10–11 that have to do with the relations between form and definition, and form and the universal. Wedin also argues that the dilemma at the conclusion of Z.13, regarding the definability of substance, is resolved in Z.16, with the notion of ‘Dual Complexity’, according to which the parts of a form exist potentially in the form, just as the parts of the c‐substance exist potentially in the c‐substance. (shrink)

Wedin addresses the debate over whether nonsubstantial individuals, that inhere in a subject but are not said of a subject, i.e. accidents, such as the pallor of Socrates, are nonrecurring particulars or a kind of determinate universal. Wedin examines the secondary literature on this topic and divides it into two schools of thought, determined by the contributions of J.L. Ackrill and G.E.L. Owen. According to Ackrill, individuals in non‐substance categories are particular to the substance they are in; Owen critiques Ackrill's (...) view, and proposes that these items can recur in more than one subject and hence are a sort of universal. Wedin finds Owen's thesis unsatisfactory, even after supplementing it with an improved version due to Michael Frede; instead, Wedin argues for a revised version of Ackrill's interpretation of nonsubstantial individuals as nonrecurrent particulars. According to Wedin, Aristotle is committed to individuals only—e.g. to Socrates and to the particular bit of pallor in him: this conclusion has an important bearing on the ontological status of individuals and on the primacy of substance to nonsubstantial items. (shrink)

Wedin considers the problem of the compatibility of the Categories account of primary substance with the theory of substantial form of the Metaphysics. Wedin collects from the secondary literature the most important arguments for incompatibilism, and offers some proposals for restoring their harmony. While admitting the evident differences in the way Aristotle treats the question of substance in each treatise, Wedin is keen to argue that these differences are not sufficient to conclude that the treatises are incompatible. Wedin singles out (...) for particular attention, and criticism, Michael Frede and Gunther Patzig's account of Metaphysics Zeta, according to which the primary substance of the Metaphysics and the basic subject of predications is the form. Wedin considers two ‘philosophical’ arguments and one ‘Aristotelian’ argument for the subjecthood of forms, and argues that the textual evidence does not support the claim that form is the subject of accidents. (shrink)

Chapters 10 and 11 are critical to the argument of Metaphysics Zeta: these chapters are concerned with the purification of form. Z.10 introduces the apparatus of part and whole and consists of an argument to the end that form and its parts have priority over the other internal structural components of c‐substances, i.e. matter and the compound of form and matter; while in Z.11 Aristotle argues that form and its parts cannot involve any admixture of matter. Wedin argues that the (...) causal role of form presupposes its purity: if form is to explain why a certain portion of matter constitutes a c‐substance of a given kind, then matter—whether this latter is understood as functional, or remnant matter—cannot already be contained in the form. This is the ‘purity thesis’, as Wedin calls it: matter cannot be included in the definitions of natural organisms, Wedin points out, because that would make the explanandum a part of the principle that explains it. Wedin also argues that form must be sufficiently complex to provide definitions of the natures of particular compounds, which are complex, even though form itself is a kind of universal. (shrink)

In the Metaphysics, Aristotle often says that ‘form is substance’: in this chapter, Wedin argues that ‘substance’ in this context means the ‘substance‐of’ c‐substances. Wedin begins by examining Aristotle's use, and retention, of the framework of the Categories in Metaphysics Zeta, before turning to discuss Z.3, which is crucial to understanding the relation between the Categories and Metaphysics theories of substance, because it is usually thought that here Aristotle departs from the substance of the Categories. Wedin denies that Z.3 involves (...) a rejection of the Categories subjecthood criterion for primary substance: Aristotle rejects only the claim that one thing is the substance of another simply if it is the primary underlying subject of the other. Wedin argues that in Z.3 Aristotle introduces the idea of the ‘substance‐of’ a thing, and identifies as candidates for the substance of c‐substances the internal structural components form, matter, and the compound of form and matter. (shrink)

Wedin discusses Aristotle's claims in Metaphysics Zeta 6 that the essence of a thing is to be sought among its per se attributes, and that each thing that is primary and spoken of per se, e.g. primary substance, is the same as its essence. Wedin argues that the Zeta 6 Thesis, i.e. that the essence of a thing is the thing's immediate essence, is a crucial requirement of the explanatory role of essence as the substance of c‐substances. According to Wedin, (...) Aristotle introduces this requirement in order to establish that a thing's essence cannot depend on another essence. Form must be the essence; if form cannot explain the nature of the thing of which it is the form, there would be the threat of a regress of explanatory forms. At the end of the chapter, Wedin considers the problem that the identity of a thing and its essence is a requirement that can be met by non‐substance items, but he denies that this leads to a dilution of the conception of substance. (shrink)

This essay explores the aspects of the Aristotelian psuchē that accounts for its contemporary appeal. The poverty of the notion of the mind is discussed. The superiority of the psuchē over the mind is emphasized.

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo refletir sobre a educação escolar no sistema prisional contemporâneo. Destacando os marcos legais e documentos oficiais que expressam e orientam o direito à educação nestes espaços não formais. Pensar a educação neste contexto é destacar a importância da educação para o processo transformador do ser humano, ou seja, a educação tem a função de promover a reintegração social do sujeito em situação de privação de liberdade. Para o desenvolvimento deste trabalho temos como abordagem qualitativa, (...) com o suporte das pesquisas bibliográfica e documental. Portanto, promover a acessibilidade da pessoa privada de liberdade, é promover não só a reintegração social via a educação, como promover o exercício da cidadania independente do fato julgado. Nestes termos, a educação escolar no sistema prisional tem sido um desafio para a reintegração social da pessoa privada de liberdade na contemporaneidade. (shrink)

The glorious anniversary of the great victory of the Soviet people and their heroic armed forces over the most aggressive armies of international imperialism provides a perspective that makes it possible to see the importance of this feat on the scale of world history, in the vivid light of the favorable influence it has exercised on all the subsequent development of sociopolitical processes on earth.